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ABSTRACT 
July 1，1997 is a crucial day for Hong Kong as Britain will hand back the 
territory's sovereignty to China on that day. This issue has been confronting 
Hong Kong for years but the effect of it to Hong Kong remains unclear. As the 
day draws closer, more foreign firms become reluctant to invest in the territory 
while domestic companies continue to diversify overseas seeking for foreign 
domiciles and secondary listings on other stock exchanges. Before June 4 in 
1989，most people believe Hong Kong will continue to prosper. After the 
Tiananmen Square Incident, less people tend to retain the same belief. 
It is the purpose of this research report to analyze the political risk 
environment in Hong Kong from the opinion of six selected business executives, 
who acted as experts for our survey, and to show how such environment would 
be affected by the 1997 issue. A comparison between the political risk 
environment in Hong Kong before and after 1997 is also studied. It is generally 
believed, according to the executives, that Hong Kong's political risk environment 
will worse off after 1997 but is expected to stabilize as time goes by. Finally, the 
risk avoidance policies proposed by the business executives to reduce the political 
risk in Hong Kong will also be discussed. Joint ventures with foreign firms, 
reduce fixed assets, international diversification of investment are the several 
most common means they adopt to reduce their risk. 
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The 1997 issue has been confronting Hong Kong ever since the signing of 
the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1983. At that time, people were optimistic 
about the future of the territory. Business firms shown little concern about the 
investment climate in Hong Kong because they believe the territory was going to 
have a bright future. But the pro-democracy Student Movement in Beijing 
aroused most people in Hong Kong to pay more attention to the future of the 
territory. People began to wonder if China would keep its promise to maintain 
the policy in Hong Kong for fifty years after 1997. Business firms began to think 
twice before they invest in the territory. People who do not have confidence in 
China plan to emigrate overseas. Business firms who doubt whether Hong Kong 
could continue to prosper have partially, or even wholly, diversify their investment 
to foreign countries. 
The purpose of this research report is to review the past literature as well 
as current issues on political environment in Hong Kong, and to present opinion 
of six selected businessmen towards the major political risk in the territory. By 
briefly reviewing the articles in the next two chapters, we define the meaning of 
political risk, identify the risk assessment method and formulate the political risk 
framework which are tailor-made for the business environment in Hong Kong. 
Later, in chapter 4，the methodology we use for this research is also described. 
Finally，in chapter 5 and 6，the results obtained are analyzed and some proposed 




Definitions of Political Risk 
The past decade saw numerous publications about political risk. Yet, the 
meaning of political risk is still confusing as it often gets mixed up with other 
non-political risks such as economic and social risks. Besides, different people 
tend to perceive political risk in different ways. Literally, political risk refers to 
"the business risk brought about by political sources or environment." 
Nevertheless, the concept of risk and political sources/environment are not at all 
easy to define. 
A review of past literatures discovered the following meanings of risk: 
1. Chance, possibility, or probability of loss (Baglini 1976). 
2. Probability of future occurrence of events or acts (Nehrt，1970; Overholt 1982; 
Poynter 1984). 
3. Actions adverse to foreign investment (Jones 1984). 
4. Potentially significant managerial contingencies (Kobrin 1982). 
5. Changes in the operating conditions (Jodice 1984). 
6. Probability that events, changes, and conditions will impact on business 
operations and goals (Lax 1983; O'Leary and Copline 1983). 
7. The multiplication of the size of a potential loss by the probability that the 
loss will occur (Nagi 1987). 
As for the meaning of political sources and political environment, its 
distinction from that of non-political is far from clear cut. 
According to Robock (1971)，political risk are generated by the following 
sources: 
(1) government in power and its operating agencies. 
(2) parliamentary opposition groups. 
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(3) non-parliamentary opposition groups. 
(4) non-organized common interest groups. 
(5) foreign government or inter-governmental agencies. 
In other words, risk events generated by sources other than any of these 
five categories would be classified as non-political and is not the interest of our 
study. 
In this research report, we will define political risk as all unwanted 
consequences adverse to business and is bought about by political sources or 
environment as defined by Robock. The unwanted consequences include the 
economic and societal disturbance caused by political risk and/or uncertainty. 
As a matter of fact, businessmen are usually more interested in the economic 
consequences of political decisions. 
Political Risk Assessment Methods 
Political risk assessment refers to a systematic means of assessing and 
managing the political risks of foreign direct investment or international business 
(Micallef 1981). 
Similar to having various definitions of political risk, there also exists 
various techniques to assessing political risk. 
Generally speaking, political risk assessment can be classified into two big 
categories: Qualitative and Quantitative. Of the qualitative approaches are: 
(1) Grand Tours. 
(2) Old Hands. 
(3) Delphi Techniques. 
while the quantitative approaches include: 
(4) Order Ranking 
(5) Decision Tree 
(6) Multiple Regression 
(7) Discriminant Analysis. 
These are just the most popular ones in current use for political 
assessment and, of course, there are many more. As a matter of fact, reliance 
on any single one of them is hardly adequate nor accurate. That's why some 
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scholars suggested to use integrated approach, i.e. a combination of two or more 
approaches, when deal with political assessment. Nevertheless, we will start by 
briefly introducing all the fore-mentioned approaches. 
Grand Tour: This is a simple but rather expensive approach. It starts 
by doing some preliminary market research and then dispatches an executive or 
a team of people on an inspection tour. Local officials are contacted and the 
political landscape is surveyed. This grand tour approach, however, may suffer 
from an overdose of selective information. The company observers may be 
insulated from the political and economic realities of the country visited. 
Old Hands: Multinational corporations can seek to acquire area or 
country expertise from seasoned educators, diplomats, journalists, or businessmen, 
or to retain such experts on a consulting basis. The capability and experience of 
the advisers often determines the quality of report. Even the experts make 
mistakes, sometimes. 
Delphi Technique: This is a more systematic approach to political risk 
analysis than the preceding two and is sometimes referred to as "Expert Opinion 
Poll." A wide range of experts are selected and asked separately to identify and 
answer a list of selective elements or questions concerning political risk. All 
answers or view-point proposed by the experts are then presented to each and 
every one of them as reference and the experts are then asked to identify or 
answer the same elements and questions again. The experts can base on the 
answers given by others to modify his own answer. This process is repeated 
several times until a set of agreed answer is resulted. 
The fore-mentioned approaches are quite popularly used in many 
companies but the current trend in risk assessment methodology is to use "hard 
data", i.e. quantitative approaches, rather than subjective analysis. Such 
quantitative approaches are discussed below: 
Order Ranking Technique: This approach is a use of index for ranking 
purposes. Among the worldwide most popular ones are: 
1. Business Internation's (BI) Index of Environmental Risk, which surveys 75 
countries twice a year on 55 factors. The assessment is conducted by a group of 
specialists from each country and BI's employees. All countries are assessed and 
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ranked on a composite scale according to the degree of risk, opportunity, and 
operating conditions. 
2. Business Environment Risk Index (BERI), which assigns a numerically 
estimated risk rank, based on 15 risk criteria, to 48 countries semi-annually. A 
permanent panel of experts ranks each country three times a year on a Likert 
scale. 
3. Political System Stability Index (PSSI) which is composed of three equally 
weighted subindexes namely socioeconomic, governmental process, and societal 
conflict indexes. 
4. Frost & Sullivan's Political Country Report (PRCR) which prepares quarterly 
reports on 80 countries based on 210 independent political analysts, businessmen, 
officials, political scientists and other country specialists. 
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Similar indexes are also available in Hong Kong. One such index is the 
Survey Research Hong Kong (SRH) Confidence Index which, with a base of 100 
points, is a poll to measure political and economic confidences for local people 
in Hong Kong. The poll started in 1983 after the signing of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration. According to this survey, the confidence level reached its lowest 
point on June 1989 during which the Tiananmen Square Incident occurred. The 
index also revealed that even in February 90，eight months after June 4，both 
economic and political confidences were not much better than in July 89，a 
month after the Tiananmen Square Incident. This is rather unlike other 
indicators such as property prices and incoming visitors which reclaimed most of 
their losses rapidly. 
Another organization which perform regular survey for Hong Kong is the 
domestic based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy which ranked the Asian 
countries according to their comparative country risk. The consultancy's system 
gives a 30% weighting to market size in its model, a similar weighting to the 
potential for economic changes and a 40% weighting to chance socio-political 
changes. According to their latest report on March 1990，China, the Philippines 
and Indonesia are the highest risk nations for business and investment in the 
Asian region. China is by far the riskiest country for social unrest. Hong Kong's 
risk level has blown out to behind Japan (the most stable Asian country) and 
Singapore (the second) since the last assessment by the group, not principally 
for domestic reasons, but because of its close ties to the mainland and the 
political and economic events in China throughout this year. 
The common threat in the political risk indexes of the rank ordering 
approach has been a reliance on expert-generated data. The problems of using 
them being: 
(1) The underlying assessments of the scoring and weighting, and even the 
definitions of the key indicators are not revealed, making it impossible to 
replicate the assessment and get the same result. 
(2) There is a lack of consensus among the raters of different indexes. A perfect 
example is illustrated by Friedmann & Kim which is reprinted in Figure 3. 
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TEN BEST POLITICAL RISKS IN 1985 TEN WORST POLITICAL RISKS IN 1985 
According to PRCR: According to BI: According to PRCR: According to BI: 
United States Singapore El Salvador Iran 
Denmark Netherlands Iran Yogoslavia 
France Norway Nicaragua Sudan 
Finland South Korea Zaire Algeria 
West Germany Saudi Arabia Zambia Mexico 
Austria Switzerland Libya Nicaragua 
Canada West Germany Bolivia chile 
Japan Britain Egypt china 
England Spain Pakistan Thailand 
Netherlands Japan Philippines Philippines 
Source: Roberto Friedmann and Jonghoon Kim, "Political Risk and International 
Marketing," Columbia Journal of World Business. Winter 1988, P.63-74. 
Figure 3. The Ten Risk-free and Ten Excessive-risk Countries 
Decision Tree Approach: This is used not to assess prospective 
investment climates but instead to estimate the probable occurrence of some 
political events and map out sequences of strategies for corporate executives in 
existing investments. The problem with this approach is that it is difficult to 
estimate the expected value of political events because subjective judgements are 
involved in determining the probability coefficients. Besides, it is very time 
consuming and frustrating to assemble an exhaustive list of causal factors and 
possible outcomes. 
Multiple Regression Analysis: This method predicts future political trends 
on the basis of past conditions. The advantage is that it is relatively simple, 
statistical tests provide insight in determining which indicators have more 
predictive power, the estimated equation coefficients provide indicator weighing. 
However, if the selection of the indicators is not based on a well-grounded 
analytical framework, the results could lead to faulty decisions. One more defect 
about multiple regression analysis is that it assumes there is a linear relationship 
between the past and future conditions. Nevertheless, it is possible that there 
could be a curvilinear relationship or simply that the future may not be an 
extension of the past. 
Discriminant Analysis: This last approach can solve the curvilinear 
relationship or multicollinearity problem that multiple regression approach cannot 
tackle. The discriminant analysis puts the countries under study into mutually 
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exclusive groups based on particular attributes. The number of such attributes 
are determined by the political analysts and countries are expected to differ on 
the attributes. The discriminant coefficients and the determining variable 
statistically chosen for significance are then used to make future projections or 
to assess the creditworthiness of a country or the propensity of its leaders to 
expropriate foreign firm. 
There isn't without limitations for discriminant analysis. The assumption 
behind this approach is that there must be two or more statistically distinct 
groups of countries. In reality, however, countries may form a continuum to 
political risk conditions. Since this approach concerns about the two extremes 
only, countries of borderline cases are very difficult to predict. Some countries 
may be falsely identified as risky when actually they are countries profitable for 
investment. Over reliance on this approach can result in missed opportunities. 
All of the fore-mentioned approaches are applicable for the situation in 
Hong Kong if only the 1997 issue is absent. Technically speaking, Grand Tour, 
Delphi Technique, Order Ranking and Discriminant Analysis are approaches that 
measure only the current status of political environment in Hong Kong while the 
rest, except Decision Tree Approach, try to infer the future environment based 
on the past. However, the 1997 issue is so drastic a change that using the past 
to infer future is doomed to be invalid. 
Only Decision Tree Approach takes into account different possibilities of 
things in the future but, as mentioned earlier, it is rather frustrating to assemble 
an exhaustive list of causal factors possibility outcome, especially when the future 
is so unclear. 
Each approach seems to have its pros and cons in assessing the political 
risk and that's why some scholars reasoned that any single one of the fore-
mentioned approaches is insufficient and that a combination of them be necessary 
if accurate result is expected. 
Political Risk Frameworks 
Frameworks to assessing political risk are also many but we will only 
discuss the representative ones in this report. 
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Friedman and Kim's model (1988) classified risks into three types: 
Operational, Ownership and Transfer. Operational risks refer to the adverse 
effects in the operations of a company, including its production, marketing and 
personnel activities. Ownership risks refer to those influencing the position and 
the volume of the investment. Transfer risks are those that restrict the transfer 
of money or fixed assets in and out of the host country. 
Robock, in early 1970s, proposed another general framework for political 
risk assessment. He distinguished between actions and policies directed at all 
foreign enterprises in a given country, characterized as "macro" political risks, and 
those aimed only at selected fields of foreign business, labelled "micro". In 
addition, the anticipation of political risk can be aided by distinguishing between 
societal and governmental related actions and policies, as well as between 
internally and externally based events. In short, Roback's political framework was 
distinguishes three dimensions: 
(1) Macro and micro political risk. 
(2) Societal and governmental related actions and policies. 
(3) Internally and externally based events. 
A similar but more comprehensive framework for identifying and 
anticipating different types of political risk of a country was developed by Simon 
(1984). His framework is concerned primarily with the identification, analysis, 
and management of political restraints on foreign investment, with main political 
risk, as well as on the interrelationships of strategies, goals, and capability of the 
company. 
Basically, the framework differentiates four main dimensions: 
(1) Open and close societies. 
(2) Industrialised and developing countries. 
(3) Direct and indirect risk. 
(4) Internal and external sources of risk. 
The first dimension, i.e. open and close societies, describe the degree of 
openness in its socio-political system. The second dimension, i.e. industrialised 
and developing countries, describes the stage of economic development. These 
countries will differ in their overall orientation towards foreign business. 
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According to this model, Hong Kong can be categorized as open and 
developing. Theoretically, the open-developing framework proposed by Simon 
is applicable to Hong Kong. The problem, however, the political risk factors 
listed by Simon are a bit too general. In order that the framework can be used 
for Hong Kong, the political risk factors must be modified so that the situation 
in Hong Kong can be applied. 
In this research report, we will base on the four dimensions used by the 
framework proposed by Simon to examine the local political risk environment. 
The modified model for Hong Kong is formulated and shown in Figure 4. 
Developing 
— 1 — 
Internal External 
Open Direct Economic stability Economic recession 
Currency convertibility Exchange rate stability 




Indirect Policy stability Change of political leaders 
Brain drain Relations with China 




Figure 4. Political Risk Framework for Hong Kong based on Simon's model. 
Political Risk Avoidance Policies 
No firms can completely eliminate political risk. Once a firm starts to 
operate, the firm is exposed to political risk. However, political risk is not all 
unavoidable. If a company takes good measures to research before starting 
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business in a region, chances of being a victim can definitely be minimized. 
Typical methods for political risk avoidance are diversification of 
investment and continuous monitoring of situation changes as political 
environment is very volatile. In addition, Brenner, in 1981，suggested some useful 
but rather low profile techniques to avoid political risks. Among them are: Joint 
Venture with Local Partner, Use Local Resources, Dependence on Parent 
Company and Be a Good Citizen under the hosfs political policy. Micaffel, on 
the other hand, suggested in the same year that Joint Venture with Foreign Firms 
and Seek International Financing are also useful for political risk avoidance. 
Poynter, in 1982，however, stated that multinational firms should take a 
more aggressive role in dealing with political risk. H e suggested that 
multinational companies should maintain operation and managerial complexity 
so that even if local government want to nationalise the company they can hardly 
continue its operation. In addition, the firm should also control sourcing, export 
distribution channels, and the skill to operate to make it even harder for the local 
government to nationalize its investment. 
Friedmenn and Kim, in 1988，advised a more scientific approach which 
suggested a typology of goods and services that have historically been affected by 
political risk events be developed. Such a typology would allow for better 
evidence in researching casual relationships and even assessing contingency 
strategies to political risk. A higher local ingredients or components of products 
is also recommended to reduce exposure to potentially damaging political risk 
events such as tariffs, quotas, or regulations which could more radically affect the 
products. 
In summary, methods to prevent political risks are: 
(1) Close down business 
(2) Reduce fixed assets investment 
(3) Increase local borrowing 
(4) Increase foreign financing 
(5) Joint venture with foreign firms 
(6) Joint venture with local companies 
(7) International diversification of investment 
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(8) Control sourcing of raw materials 
(9) Control knowledge/skill to operate 
(10) Control export and distribution channels 
(11) Adapt to local political policy 
All of these avoidance methods are applicable to Hong Kong and thus will 





For many years, Hong Kong has enjoyed the reputation as one of the 
finest international business centres in Asia. Its perfect location as a gateway to 
China, where there is plenty of market potential to be explored, attracted 
business firms from all over the world to invest in Hong Kong. Hong Kong also 
enjoys the best logistics, communication and transportation which makes the 
territory a trade centre competing with Japan and Singapore. 
Per Capita GDP Per Capita GDP 
at constant (1980) at current 
Year market price (HK$) market price (HK$) 
1980 27,075 27,075 
1981 28,936 31,827 
1982 29,350 35,393 
1983 30,785 38,832 
1984 33,374 46,079 
1985 32,980 47,871 
1986 36,393 54,372 
1987 40,822 65,589 
1988 43,267 75,214 
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics 
Figure 5. Real and Current GDP per capita in Hong Kong. 
After the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989，Hong Kong saw a lot of 
changes economically to the territory. Due to the incident, many people lost 
confidence in China. Businessmen in Hong Kong began to suspect if Hong Kong, 
whose sovereignty will be handed back to China after 1997，could continue to 
prosper. People also saw the relationship between China and U.S. began to -
deteriorate. Since China and U.S. are the two largest trade partners of Hong 
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Kong, their deteriorating relationship would mean Hong Kong to hurt the most. 
Uncertainty concerning the future of Hong Kong also caused a lot of 
people to immigrate to foreign countries. This poses a even more serious 
problem of labour shortage, which has already been a problem for Hong Kong 
for several years. Many business firms also decided to seek for foreign domiciles 
and secondary listings on other stock exchanges. As a result, Hong Kong's 
regional role in financial services is under threat, particularly from Singapore and 
Japan which are constantly taking away Southeast Asia and North Asia business 
from Hong Kong. If this situation continues, it is estimated that Hong Kong will 
in future be reduced to a service centre primarily for China and Taiwan rather 
than for the rest of Asia as well. 
According to Business International Forecasting Services Group, Hong 
Kong's economy is expected to remain sluggish during the coming year, with 
uneven export demand and a persistent labour shortage which has hindered 
business expansion. The group attributes the current downturn in the economy 
to the world economy reaching a new low point in the business cycle and the 
slowdown in China's economy as a result of last year's prodemocracy crackdown 
in Tiananmen Square. However, the Group is expecting the economy to revive 
in the very near future which it will be in line with an anticipated global upswing. 
Exchange Rate Stability 
Hong Kong dollar is linked to the U S dollar at an exchange rate of 
approximately US$1 to HK$7.8. That means Hong Kong will follow the 
fluctuation of U.S. in the foreign exchange market and can be traded like the 
U.S. dollar in most countries in the world. This is achieved by buying and selling 
of foreign currencies using the foreign currency reserve. In this respect, Hong 
Kong dollar is considered to be very stable towards U.S. dollars. With respect 
to other currencies, Hong Kong dollar is as volatile as the U.S. dollar. 
In fact, there isn't without pressure to the tie between U.S. dollar and 
Hong Kong dollars. In case Hong Kong's economy worse off to such a level that 
no more people would like to hold Hong Kong dollars any more, it is very likely 
that such linkage will break. 
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Currency Convertibility 
Since Hong Kong dollar is linked to the U.S. dollar at a fixed exchange 
rate, as discussed in the preceding section, and can be traded freely for any other 
currencies all over the world. Unfortunately, this is not so for Chinese Yuan. 
After 1997，Hong Kong's sovereignty is handed back to China. Can Hong 
Kong dollar still be traded freely in any places all in the world? W e will find out 
this from the business executives' points of view in this research. 
Price Stability 
Generally speaking, stability of price refers to the possible fluctuation of 
domestic prices. A decrease in price means worth of money increases. The 
reasons accounted for this is lowered cost due to improved technology, increased 
labour productivity and cheaper raw material, components and parts. Advantages 
of price decrease is that people can buy more with a fixed amount of money. 
The territory can also become more competitive in the world market. 
O n the other hand, an increase in price means money worthies less and 
the territory would become less competitive. Price increase can generally be 
indicated by inflation which in term can be inferred by consumer price indexes. 
According to data obtainable from Government Census and Statistics 
Department, the three Consumer Price Indexes and their growth rates in Hong 
Kong for the past five years are listed in the Figure 6. 
High inflation would decrease Hong Kong competitiveness, lower workers' 
standards of living and erode savings. Under a high level of price inflation, 
workers' living standard can only be compensated by urging for higher wages 
which, unfortunately, may further push price inflation to a even higher level. 
The past few years saw a rapid level of wage inflation in Hong Kong from 
3 % in 1985 to 10% in 1990. Such a high level of wage inflation was not a 
problem for Hong Kong when Hong Kong's economy was also growing, with 
increased investment and increased production and, more importantly, increased 
productivity to pay the higher wages. But when the economy begins to slow 
down, which is likely the case in 1990s, and demand for goods and service falls 
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1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Consumer Price Index (A) 101.4 103.7 109.4 117.5 132.6 
Growth Rate 2.27% 5.50% 7.40% * 
Consumer Price Index (B) 101.6 104.0 109.5 117.6 132.1 
Growth Rate 2.36% 5.29% 7.40% * 
Hang Seng Consumer Price Index 102.3 105.7 112.5 122.3 139.7 
Growth Rate 3.32% 6.43% 8.71% * 
note： The three Consumer Price Index series were derived from the Household Expenditure 
Survey conducted in 1984-85. They are defined in terms of the percentage distribution of 
households by expenditure as follows: 
I • 
Index Approx. of Household covered Monthly expend, in 84-85 
C P K A ) 50% $ 2,000 - $ 6,499 
C P K B ) 30% $ 6,500 - $ 9,999 
Hang Seng CPI 10% $10,000 - $24,999 
* Data extract from Government Census and Statistics Department. 
Figure 6. Consumer Price Indexes. 
off, the opportunities for greater output, greater efficiencies and greater 
productivity are less. Then, higher wages can become damaging by pushing up 
the costs of businesses which are unlikely to pass their higher costs on in a 
declining market. 
Businessmen are usually more concern with increase in price of raw 
materials or parts/components since these are directly related to the cost of 
J 
products they manufacture and/or market. Hong Kong can save some increase 
in inflation as a result of the devaluation of the Chinese yuan and the impact it 
has on imports from the mainland but this will not help control domestically 
driven inflation in the territory. It may become even more important when 
demand for Hong Kong's goods and service is not just slowing in the domestic 
market, but the world market as well. 
Some remedies to combat inflation are: 
(1) Permission for importing labour because they are cheaper than most local 
labour. This measure can also help solve the refugee problem because they are 
also cheaper than the locals. 
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(2) End the Hong Kong-US dollar peg. Hong Kong dollars should be linked to 
a basket of strong currencies rather than keeping it tied just to U.S. dollars. 
Restriction on Capital/Profit Repatriation 
Currently, there is no restriction on capital/profit repatriation in Hong 
Kong. Thanks to this policy, foreign firms are happy to invest in the territory. 
Due to the uncertainty in Hong Kong after 1997，more and more firms are 
moving away to set core activities elsewhere, taking away with them all or part 
of their capital/profit. This clearly indicates that many business firms fear there 
may be restriction on capital/profit repatriation after 1997. If, however, it is 
found that such restriction on capital/profit repatriation in Hong Kong after 1997 
does not exist, then capital may stop to flow away and even those that have flown 
away may flow back. 
Economic Recession 
A economic recession is a decline in total output, income, employment & 
trade, and it is usually marked by widespread contractions in many sectors of the 
economy. 
Hong Kong is not a self content city and depends heavily on trading. Most 
of the locally needed raw materials and parts are imported from foreign countries 
while a high percentage of local production is for export purposes. In case of any 
possible economic recession, Hong Kong may have to stand more on its own and 
thus its economic environment is doomed to be adversely affected. 
Labour Productivity 
The key to economic growth is an increase in productivity. When a typical 
worker produces more in an hour, the labour productivity increases. However, 
this must be associated with reasonable growth in wage inflation. If wage growth 
is faster than output increase per worker, then such labour productivity will not 
be justified. As a matter of fact, labour productivity in Hong Kong is considered 
to be very good compared to other nations in Asia but this may become no 
longer justified by a high level of wage inflation in recent years. 
Many companies, especially manufacturers competing in price, decided to 
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move their production plants into China where cheap labours are readily 
available. Leaving behind high value added manufacturing activity of which real 
output per worker stayed constant at approximately nine percent increase per 
year in the period 1980-87 while real output per worker in services sector 
increased only three per cent in the same period. 
Change of Political Leaders 
When we talk about political leaders in Hong Kong, we refer to three 
kinds of political leaders. They are political leaders in Hong Kong, Britain and 
China. 
The Governor, i.e. Sir David Wilson, is by far the closest to Hong Kong 
yet he has the least power in determining the future of the territory. Since the 
Governor is appointed at the pleasure of the Crown, there would be no 
constitutional difficulty in replacing him as well. H e is also directly responsible 
to the Foreign Secretary in London and thus he is closely constrained in what he 
can do. According to Mr. Norman Miners of the Political Science at the 
University of Hong Kong, there is even more limitation posed to the governor in 
accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration which stated that all important 
issues of internal policy should be discussed and settled by agreement at meetings 
by both the Chinese and British sides. In this sense, Britain's policies in Hong 
Kong are only part of its policy towards China. 
Mrs. Thatcher, of the Conservation Party, is currently the leader of the 
British Parliament. The Conservation Party has shown an admirable firmness in 
administering Hong Kong in spite of popular opposition about the nationality 
package by the Labour Party. So long as Mrs. Thatcher remains Prime Minister, 
there is no danger of abdication of imperial responsibility in Hong Kong. The 
problem is, as a recent poll conducted in Britain, that popularity of Mrs. Thatcher 
hits the lowest point of all Prime Ministers in history. If the Labour Government 
returns to power at the British general election in 1992，it is possible that such 
attitude towards Hong Kong may change. 
As for China, change of political leaders is the most difficult to predict. 
To make things more complicated, the one who is in charge may not necessarily 
be the one with highest authority. For example, the current number one leader 
• • 绝 中 文 大 學 明 當 体 栽 當 I 
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in China is Giang Zemin but it is believed that Deng Siu-peng still has the 
greatest influence over the policies in China. 
The current situation in Hong Kong is that most of Legislative Councillors 
are appointed rather than elected. But people generally agreed that more direct 
election implies more autonomy to Hong Kong after 1997. That's why Hong 
Kong residents are fighting for a faster pace in direct election before 1997. 
Policy Stability 
W e believe the change of political leaders and the policy stability are 
highly correlated. If the governmental structure and the leaders in power do not 
change, the policy should be very stable (Of course there are exceptions). 
Therefore, policy stability depends very much on stability of leaders in power. 
The government in Hong Kong advocates a laissez-faire policy and leaves 
its hands off the economy as much as possible. The business environment is free 
and flexible. Some even attribute the laissez-faire policy to the economic growth 
and equity in Hong Kong. Looking ahead, one expects little change in the fiscal 
and monetary policy, in the tax structure, in the form of business regulations in 
the years before 1997 when the sovereignty of Hong Kong is reverted to China. 
However, one cannot help noticing the increasing noises and concern on the 
political structure of the government after 1997 since China is such a source of 
risk. 
As M u n and H o (1979) suggested that the political situation of Hong Kong 
is almost entirely decided upon by Beijing. This is readily shown by the 
downgrade of Hong Kong issued bonds from A2 to A3 when China's rating 
dropped from A3 to B A A l after the Tiananmen Square Incident. Hong Kong's 
economic future is dependent on China's intentions towards the territory and its 
ability to carry out those intentions. 
Brain Drain 
The term brain drain refers to the loss of professional expertise or skilled 
labours to overseas countries by emigration. This is a serious problem because 
the success of a society depends on the presence and commitment of the talented 
professionals and the riches. In case of instability of the society, these people are 
% 
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usually the first to move away. 
Before June 4，not many people concerned about the right to abode in 
overseas countries. People did not care very much about this issue because they 
have confidence in Hong Kong after 1997. "Fifty years unchange for policy in 
Hong Kong" is what the Hong Kong residents have been promised. After June 
4，however, such confidence vanished. People who can afford to emigrate began 
to look for passports so that in case there are any changes in Hong Kong after 
1997，they can leave immediately. 
After June 4，Singapore is the first country which offers residentship for 
Hong Kong citizens. Following Singapore, many countries, including Canada, 
New Zealand and South African, also considered relaxing immigration restrictions 
for Hong Kong residents. Even firms which faced acute loss of employees due 
to brain drain considered providing emigration assistance programmes for their 
middle to senior executives by way of transfers to other offices outside Hong 
Kong. This is popular for multinational companies with offices in the United 
States, Australia, Canada or France. 
British Government later also agreed to grant 225,000 citizens in Hong 
Kong the right of abode in British. Though this number is far from adequate, the 
scheme can still act as an insurance policy and will contribute towards reducing 
the brain drain which threatens to undermine confidence in the territory. Of 
course，all these are highly welcome by Hong Kong residents but some pointed 
out, however, that the nationality package for only 50,000 Hong Kong households 
would cause divisions and jealousy among Hong Kong people. 
What effects would be posed by the nationality package to Hong Kong 
after 1997 is too early to say because it may not even get pass the Parliament. 
One problem which is likely to occur is that in case situation in Hong Kong turns 
worse and the economy suffers a slump after 1997，those people with overseas 
passports may choose to quit Hong Kong, making the situation in Hong Kong 
even worse. No commitment to the territory is the rationale against not offering 
nationality package to Hong Kong people. 
China is suspicious of Britain's intent behind its right of abode offer for 
Hong Kong and complained that the package was aimed at turning all key 
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personnel in Hong Kong into Britain subjects, or to extend British authority in 
the territory after 1997. As for maintaining and preserving its economic 
prosperity and social stability in Hong Kong up to 30 June 1997，Chinese leaders 
do not deem the scheme necessary for Hong Kong. As a matter of fact, they 
were afraid the scheme would be counter-productive. Giving the right to abode 
to Hong Kong citizens means dragging people away or accelerating people's 
motives to go, China thinks. 
This is also why the China authority constantly criticized the nationality 
package for causing confusion and undermining the stability of the territory. 
They threatened not to recognize the status of those Hong Kong residents who 
will benefit from the special nationality package granted by Britain and will do 
anything they can to stop the implementation of the scheme. 
China also said they already had made many concessions, including more 
directly-elected seats to the Legislative Council, to Hong Kong and the people 
of the territory should reciprocate by putting trust in the Beijing Government. 
Labour Shortage 
The term brain drain and labour shortage are similar except the latter 
usually refers to a broader base, i.e. lack of skilled and unskilled labour for all 
sectors in a society. 
There are two common ways to overcome labour shortage. One is 
rectified through greater capital investment. The other is to transfer production 
to less developed countries where cheap labour is readily available. 
Hong Kong has seen its labour force dropped from about five per cent in 
1970s to 1.5% in 1988. At the same time, real wages have been rising and labour 
productivity in the manufacturing sector has been decreasing. But because of the 
tight supply of labour, some sectors of the economy will have to grapple with high 
staff turnover and recruitment difficulties. In such circumstances, wage increases 
would be sustained at a high rate and remain a major source of inflationary 
pressure. As more people start to immigrate, labour shortage and inflation is 
expected to remain at a high level. 
As for combating labour shortage in Hong Kong, most manufacturer of 
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low valued goods in Hong Kong choose to shift production plants to lower labour 
cost centres in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and China. 
Suggestions to put forward to ease the management supply, including the 
attraction of more expatriate managers, encouraging emigrants to return and 
importing managers from the mainland. 
The most pragmatic answer is for the business of Hong Kong to have very 
practical programmes to strain and promote younger managers - people who are 
willing to stay in Hong Kong and commit to its future. 
Industrial Relations 
Industrial relations in Hong Kong for the past decade was pretty stable 
until last year when several large scale protest broke out. Nurses strike for better 
pay and use work-to-nile as their strategy. C M B drivers refused to drive before 
10:00 a.m. on 29 Nov. 1989 followed by K C B drivers，four hours sit-in protest on 
4 Apr. 1990 are both aimed at putting pressure to their employers for better 
compensation. Even civil servants like firemen launched a sit-in protest and 
hunger strike to fight for shorter work hour. Policemen's morale are also 
deteriorating due to their lack of work force and the pressure put on by the 
Vietnamese boat people. 
The main rationale behind the discontent of employees are labour 
shortage and higher inflation. Labour shortage causes extra-work for other 
employees and high inflation caused their living standard to diminish. 
The rapid deterioration of the morale of civil servants and the quality of 
services offered is expected to be the major difficulties facing the territory over 
the coming few years. But how this will be affected by the 1997 issue will be 
surveyed in this research. 
Social Demonstration 
Demonstration is a way of showing discontent for living standard, unfair 
treatment, government policy... etc. Demonstration can be in form of public 
meeting and procession. The number of demonstration in a region is a good 
indicator of the degree of dissatisfaction of local citizens and a sign of social 
2 4 
unrest. According to government records, police received 297 applications for 
public meeting and another 290 for processions in 1989. The number is a drastic 
change of more than six times the statistics for 1984，when only 38 requests for 
public assemblies and 31 for mass processions were filed. 
Applications 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Public Meetings 38 108 82 92 176 297 
Disallowed 1 2 1 3 3 2 
Processions 31 83 169 172 199 290 
Disallowed 4 1 4 2 5 3 
Source: SCMP, 14 April, 1990 
Figure 7. Number of Demonstrations in Hong Kong. 
Demonstration in form of public meeting and procession by nature would 
not cause harm to the society and, in fact, can be a means of getting rid of 
discontent. However, in a situation when the crowd is very concerned, angry or 
volatile, or when counter-demonstration is likely to occur, then the protests may 
turn into violence or riot. Another consequence, which may has a more direct 
impact on business in Hong Kong, is when demonstration developed into the 
form of large scale strike in order to put more pressure on the government. 
Fortunately, much of the protests in the past years were caused by 
discontent towards the policies of mainland China rather than local government, 
especially after the June 4 incident. It is anticipated that the number of 
demonstrations will continue to increase, mainly for the purpose of urging more 
democratic reform in China and more autonomy for Hong Kong as 1997 draw 
closer. Whether it will continue to increase beyond 1997 will be researched in 
our survey. 
Riot 
Reasons for occurrence of riot are similar to demonstration except that 
they are displayed in more volatile and violent ways. Fortunately, riot in Hong 
Kong is extremely rare in the past, maybe due to the fact that Hong Kong 
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citizens are obedient by nature, or that they are not yet discontented or 
dissatisfied to the extend to cause riots. It is definitely sure, however, that the 
more riots means more social unrest and would cause disturbance in the Hong 
Kong economy ultimately. 
Government Structure 
Government structure can be classified into different types according to 
their tendency for radical political change, with democratic systems given a low 
probability for this occurrence and newly independent states a high one. 
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Figure 8 . Comparison of the newly agreed political model with others. 
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A convergence of political systems before and after the 1997 handover was 
secured after Beijing and London ironed out their differences over the pace of 
democratisation for the territory. The final version of Hong Kong's future 
constitution was endorsed by the Basic law drafters at the mid Feb, 1990. Hong 
Kong government announced that it would raise the planned 10 directly-elected 
seats for the 1991 polls to 18. The number will be increased to not less than 20 
in 1995. A comparison of the newly agreed political model with others on or 
beyond 1997 is diagrammed Figure 8. 
Relations with China 
The past decade saw a very stable and close relation between China and 
Hong Kong, especially when there is a huge amount of capital investment flow 
into China via Hong Kong. China and Hong Kong are in a position that is 
mutually benefit. 
The June 4 incident is a turning point for this relation. After June 4， 
people become uncertain about the policy in Hong Kong after 1997 and began 
to fight for more autonomy for the territory. China, in turn, accused Hong Kong 
as being a subversive plant. 
The Yang Yang Incident further weakened the relationship between Hong 
Kong and China who revenged by not taking back illegal Chinese immigrants. 
The nationality package for Hong Kong residents is another issue that 
China doesn't feel quite happy. Although most of these problems are solved, 
relationship between China is still a very important subject that mustn't be 
neglected. 
Relations with Foreign Countries 
Hong Kong has been trying to be neutral in dealing with foreign countries 
and as a result its relations with foreign countries is very good. As far as we can 
recall, there seems no countries particularly that Hong Kong voted not to deal 
with. Even for China and Taiwan, whose policies are against each other are both 
good with Hong Kong at the same time. 
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W e will learn whether such good relations with foreign countries could 





This is a descriptive study targets at illuminating the attitudes of business 
executives towards the political risk for business in Hong Kong. The survey was 
conducted by using semi-structured, undisguised questionnaires of which each 
questionnaire would be mailed to the designated respondent with an 
accompanying cover letter. The respondents completed the questionnaire at their 
leisure and mailed their replies back to us. By analyzing the results of this 
survey, a tentative picture can be built up for various executives' opinions, the 
types of problems faced, and the strategies to avoid exposure to political risk. 
The target population for this study were the business organizations which 
were listed in the "Dun's Market Guide to Hong Kong Business 1988". They 
include both the local and the foreign companies. In order to secure meaningful 
data，only companies that have the strength and resources to consider the 
importance of political risk were used for sampling. It was arbitrarily assumed 
that they were companies with 50 or more employees. Company heads such as 
the managing directors or general managers were usually the most influential 
people in any decision making. They were chosen to respond for the opinions 
of their companies. 
Data Collection Method 
Secondary Data 
At the outset of the study, it was intended to collect relevant data 
concerning the political risk for business in Hong Kong. Secondary data which 
is useful to us include the published external secondary data and data supplied 
by commercial marketing information services. 
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"ABI INFORM" was an on-line computer search which was useful for 
locating published information and data in the last five years. The researcher can 
use on-line data base to search for journal articles according to their own needs. 
Additionally, exploratory insights into the problem could also easily be gained 
by reviewing the current issues on the newspapers. 
"Dun's Market Guide to Hong Kong Business 1988" is a roster of about 
20,000 companies. The address, number of employees, respondents，and 
descriptions of the business organizations are arranged alphabetically according 
to the companies' names. It allows the marketing researchers to access the 
information on a company-by-company basis. The "Hong Kong Monthly Digest 
of Statistics" also offers us great help in which it gathers the key economic data 
encompassing different industries. 
Primary Data 
The primary data was collected through mail questionnaires during which 
a semi-structured, undisguised questionnaire was used. There were reasons for 
choosing "mail" as the method of administration. First, it did not cost much, and 
it was sometimes the only way of contacting the relevant population, such as 
managing director who will not sit still for an arranged personal or telephone 
interview but may respond to a mail questionnaire. Second, it permits control of 
the bias caused by the interviewer-interviewee interaction. Respondents were 
also able to work at their own pace and produced better-thought-out responses. 
However, there are several disadvantages. Mail questionnaires afford the 
researcher little control in securing a response from the intended respondent. It 
also affords little speed control, and thus it will involve a time lapse of several 
weeks for the questionnaires to reach the respondents, be completed, and find 
their way back. 
One has to contend with busy managing directors who have better things 
to do with their time than answer questionnaires. However, it was the fact that 
our attitude surveys produced low response rates i.e. 10%. Therefore, D E L P H I 
T E C H N I Q U E was then used in which each business expert, acting separately, 
answer the questionnaire in a systematic, independent, and repeated manner 
3 0 
until consensus was reached. 
Sampling Design 
Sampling Procedures 
The target population for this study was the business organizations which 
resided in Hong Kong. "Dun's Market Guide to Hong Kong Business 1988" is 
the sampling frame. This is an appropriate sampling frame in which it contains 
an accurate listing of both the local and foreign companies, although some of 
them are omitted and unlisted. In this research, a non-probability, judgement 
sample is used, and experts from different companies are selected as the sample 
elements. Since they are the representatives of our population of interests, they 
will be treated to the indepth political risk analysis. 
Sample Size 
In our experts' opinion poll, six experts are purposely identified and 
selected, of whom they represent professionals from companies of different 
industries. They are chosen not only because they are the representatives but 
also they offer some insight and perspective on the research questions as well. 
Sampling and Nonsampling Errors 
Nonprobability samples involve personal judgement somewhere in the 
selection process. In this research, the fact that the elements are not selected 
randomly precludes an assessment of "sampling errors". 
Nonsampling errors may arise because of errors in conception, logic, 
analysis, data gathering, and so forth. The major category of nonsampling in our 
survey is errors of nonobservation. It can, in turn, be divided into noncoverage 
errors and nonresponse errors. 
Noncoverage is a problem in our mail questionnaires. The business 
directory dictates the sampling frame. Since the directory may not adequately 
represents segments of the population, the survey will then suffer from the bias 
of noncoverage due to the fact that the directory can not exactly capture the 
population that we wish to stay. 
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Nonresponse error represents a failure to obtain information from some 
elements of the population that were selected and designated from the sample. 
It arises because the designated respondents (i.e. managing directors) refused to 
participate. However, our research is utilizing the Delphi Technique of experts' 
opinion poll. The response rate is 100%, and thus a systematic bias is excluded. 
Data Analysis 
The data collected in the questionnaires were used for the following 
analysis: 
1. Attitude Measurement 
A "snake" diagram is plotted in which it shows a contrasting profile for the 
respondents' opinions on the riskiness of different political situations before and 
after 1997. 
2. Frequency distribution of 
The respondents opinions on the major political risk avoidance taken by 
their companies. 
Questionnaire Design 
The complete questionnaire was divided into six parts: 
(1) The growing interdependence of political, social and economic environment 
continue to present serious problems for both the local and foreign enterprises 
in Hong Kong, the first question here will examine the attitudes of the experts 
towards the political risk for business in Hong Kong before and after 1997. 
Attitude usually connotes a preference regarding the positive-neutral-
negative feelings for the object. In this attitude survey, respondents were given 
a interval scale of numbers from 1 to 5 which denoted the favouritism of the 
political risk factors toward their business. They were asked to answer 
descriptively according to their own perception. All the risk factors were 
identified from the Jeffery D. Simon's political risk framework and meanwhile 
they were influencing Hong Kong's political destiny as well. 
All political risk factors are classified into three categories for risk 
assessment as shown in the following table. 
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ECONOMIC RISK SOCIAL RISK GOVERNMENTAL RISK 
Economic stability Industrial Relation Restriction on capital/profit 
repatriation 
Exchange rate stability Social demonstrations 
Changes of political leaders 
Currency convertibility Riots 
Government structure 
Stability of prices Relations with China 






Figure 9. Risk Factors Classification 
(2) The second question deals with the demographic characteristics of the 
companies. 
(3) The third question asks about the respondents opinions about the three 
major political risk factors which might affect their business before and after 
1997. 
(4) The fourth question inquires about the rating of the overall risk for business 
before and after 1997 as perceived by the respondents. 
(5) The fifth question asks the respondents' opinions about the most appropriate 
risk avoidance policies for their business in Hong Kong. 
(6) The sixth question asks the respondents if they can suggest any additional 
risk avoidance policies for their corporation. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In the expert opinion poll, Delphi Technique was used in which each of 
the six individual experts, acting separately, pool their opinion in a systematic and 
repeated manner until consensus was reached. Initially, the experts are asked 
separately to grade a scale of 1 to 5 over identified elements concerning the 
political issues in Hong Kong. The scale 1 stands for the least favourable 
whereas scale 5 implies most favourable. After the results had been collected 
and compiled, each expert was received a copy of the results and was asked for 
their solutions again. W e executed the opinion three times and finally the 
consensus has been reached. The results are tabulated in Figure 10 and analyzed 
as follows: 
Economic Stability 
From the experts，view points, Hong Kong economic stability will remain 
fairly favourable (3.83) as 1997 is approaching but become less favourable (2.75) 
afterwards. It may be due to the fact that some people are worrying the Chinese 
government may install a tighter control of the economic policies for Hong Kong 
after 1997. It gives rise to the problems such as high inflationary rate, external 
debt levels or shortage in supplies and it in turn induces economic instability. 
Exchange Rate Stability 
The respondents believe that the exchange rate is highly favourable (4.67) 
as 1997 is approaching, but becomes less so (3.00) after 1997. This indicates that 
some executives do not have confidence on exchange rate stability after the 
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Figure 10. The Expert Opinion PolL by using Delphi Technique. 】 
Currency Convertibility 
According to the experts' points of view, currency convertibility is in an 
excellent position (5.00) before 1997，but will become fairly favourable (3.17) 
afterwards. When people do not have confidence in the territory (i.e. Hong 
Kong), less people will be willing to hold Hong Kong Dollars, which in term 
means convertibility decreased. 
Price Stability 
The average prices paid by consumers has risen through most of our 
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recent history. Actually, a small rate of inflation make it easier for the economy 
to adjust to changes and to maintain a high level of employment. Since the 
inflationary pressures were largely domestically generated, government expects 
inflation to stay high, with the indication from the trend of the Consumer Price 
Index. 
From the experts' sight, the transition of 1997 causes the downfall of price 
stability (i.e. from 4.00 to 3.33) but still remains in a favourable situation. Some 
people worry that the Chinese government may restore to tighter control of the 
economy or even return to the old central planning system. The government 
economists believe in the possibility of the fluctuations of the prices. However, 
they expect inflation to ease as domestic demand slows down and the world 
commodity prices soften. 
Restriction on Capital/ Profit Repatriation 
Another powerful tool at the disposal of foreign governments is the 
imposition of restrictions on the repatriation of profits and capital. In certain 
instances, this strategy is used when internal disorders and apprehension 
concerning the future lead to a sudden outflow of foreign capital. 
Respondents believe that capital or profit repatriation is achieving an 
excellent position (5.00), i.e. owners of foreign firms are absolutely free to retreat 
with their capital profit from the territory before 1997，but the condition will 
become fairly unfavourable (2.25) after the handover of Hong Kong to China. 
Hong Kong is the third largest financial service centre in the world. Foreign-
exchange balance is controlled in a free market. Even in the times of political 
uncertainty - such as the period following the Tiananmen Square Incident -
capital outflows freely as emigration increases and business confidence falls. The 
survey illustrates that the confidence of the business people will greatly drop after 
1997. This may be due to the fact that Chinese government is fond of the 
practice of trial and error, many of the regulations for capital or profit 
repatriation are subjected to environment change and amendment. Therefore, 
the investors confidence is still a long way to recover and current tension do exist. 
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Economic Recession 
The respondents view that the economic recession is rather unlikely (4.17) 
before the transition of 1997，but may become fairly likely (3.00) after 1997. 
Hong Kong has an extremely resilient economy and in an overhead position for 
a few years. However, after the transition of 1997, the demands for goods and 
services may fall off, the opportunity for greater output, greater efficiencies and 
greater productivity are less. These are the possible reasons why the respondents 
felt that the economy is going to be worse off. 
Labour Productivity 
The experts feel that the labour productivity is highly favourable (4.00) 
before 1997 but becomes less so (3.17) after 1997. Since Hong Kong has faced 
the capacity labour shortage problems for a long time, it can be solved by 
exploiting the potential of South East Asian countries. By transferring its 
manufacturing base lower-cost centres in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
China would be an appropriate solution. Since, the labour productivity there are 
low compared with Hong Kong, the experts foresee the drop in labour 
productivity after 1997. 
However, our research group holds an added view in regard to the 
previous mentioned experts' opinions. A n improvement in the technology, quality 
(i.e. education) of the labour force, methods of production and allocation of 
resources can also give rise to the increase in labour productivity. Additionally, 
some economists forecast that the ambitious port and airport development 
projects would boost productivity too. 
Change of Political Leaders 
1997 comes to Hong Kong with the turnover of the sovereignty to 
mainland China, and it brings over the change of policies as well as the political 
leaders. In our survey, our experts perceive that the change of political leaders 
may still keep the business environment in a fairly favourable position (3.56) 
before 1997 but will become highly unfavourable (1.67) afterwards. 
Today, the Hong Kong Legislative Council consists mainly the 
conservatives and liberals. Some are also the committees who made the major 
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concessions in the Basic Final Draft. People argue that the final blueprint was 
one that satisfied no one. W h o can lead Hong Kong's future? W h o will the 
political leaders head the Special Administration Region (SAR) in 1997? Martin 
Lee, Vincent Lo or other Chinese high-ranking officials who prefer a slower pace 
of reform. It is still in the guessing game. Some investors are worrying that there 
may be a change of the chief officials in China, which, in turn, affects the existing 
policies in Hong Kong. Some respondents may view that the change of chief 
government officials poses the biggest political threat to them. As a citizen of 
Hong Kong, we are looking forward to some thoughtful, perceptive men and 
women to lead the territory when the 1997 transition moment comes. 
Policy Stability 
This is a risk that affects the operations of an investment most directly. 
It is no doubt that Hong Kong's policies are highly stable (3.83) under the rules 
of the British Government. This is the general view hold by the respondents too. 
After the sovereignty of Hong Kong is returned to China, respondents believed 
that the policy stability will become highly unstable (1.83). Before the June 4 
Incident, the Chinese Government had been adopting an open door policy, and 
Hong Kong people were generally optimistic about the future political 
environment of China. After the June 4，the Beijing Government's brutal 
suppression of the student demonstration, has proved once again that China 
operates by its own set of rules and standards, which are inexplicable to the 
watching world. Ten years of winning confidence through its "open door" policies 
and economic reform have been wasted in one night of slaughter. It is no 
wonder why people are pessimistic about the policy stability under the "One 
Country, Two Rule System". 
Brain Drain 
According to S R H research conducted at Jun 1989，17% of the 
respondents or their family members have already had residency right of some 
foreign countries. It is also proven by the respondents' opinions that before 1997， 
the brain drain problems would be very intense (1.83). However, they would 
believe such brain drain current will be stabilized (3.33) after 1997. 
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Recently, the British Government offers 225,000 full British passports to 
Hong Kong people in the hope of maintaining the stability of Hong Kong. More 
than half of the multinational companies with offices in U.S., Australia, Canada 
and France have provided emigration assistance programmes for their middle to 
senior executives. According to Mr. Andrew Tsui, managing director of executive 
search firm Russell Reynolds Associates, said if more country countries could 
offer the right of abode to Hong Kong executives without residency requirements, 
it would help to curb the worsening brain drain problem. Some companies now 
gives more attention to well-structured compensation schemes, training and 
development programmes and they will help to stabilize the brain drain current 
too. 
Labour Shortage 
Human Resources is the most important assets in the organizations. As 
the emigration current is intensifying, labour shortage becomes the hottest issue 
and hardest problem to solve throughout the manufacturing and service sectors 
in Hong Kong. The respondents believe that staff turnover and recruitment 
difficulties are going to be in a unfavourable condition (1.83) before 1997 but will 
become better off (3.61) afterwards. 
As predicted by the economists, the territory may face the economic 
downturn after 1997 transition, and it implies the labour demand will not be as 
keen as before. In addition, greater capital investment, more attractive salary 
packages, and a transfer of production to less developed countries, these can also 
minimize the labour shortage problem in Hong Kong to a great extent. 
Industrial Relations 
Recently, civil servants such as firemen, dental surgeon assistants, court 
prosecutors, inoculators, midwives, nurses surveying officers and police 
superintendents are already leading the way in the fight for better pay and 
conditions. Some also have threatened industrial action if their grievances are 
not given prompt attention. The recent successful strike by China Motor Bus 
(CMB) drivers had great impact on civil servant unions, prompting them to be 
more ready for industrial action. In reality, the labour relations experts believed 
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that more confrontational industrial disputes in both the private and public 
sectors could appear in the coming year with the slowing down of Hong Kong's 
overall economy. 
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Figure 11. Households having Residency Right of a Foreign Country or Intend to migrate. 
The respondents also foresee the industrial relation be less favourable 
(2.83) before 1997 and will be improved slightly (3.00) afterwards. As the 
sovereignty of Hong Kong returns to China, collective bargaining as a means to 
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settle industrial disputes between employers and employees might be more fully 
implemented. Therefore, there is no reason why the industrial relations should 
not be improved. 
Social Demonstrations 
This type of internal violence is the most publicized forms of societal 
related actions that can harm a large portion of both the local and foreign 
business sectors. In Hong Kong, quite a number of social demonstrations have 
been taken places during recent years. 
The respondents view that social demonstrations are fairly likely to happen 
(2.5) but will be less likely to occur (3.5) after 1997. It means that the political 
risk for social unrest and disorder will be stabilized with the transition of 1997. 
This considerable improvement on the position may be due to the fact that the 
communist regime in Beijing would impose a tighter control of strikes and 
demonstrations for post 1997 Hong Kong. Moreover, the development of 
political parties also provides a focus and a forum for the organised expression 
of political views held sincerely by the like-minded people. Although political 
parties oppose each other, but it encourages Hong Kong people to channel their 
anger and grievances in a more positive direction. 
Riots 
Often times protests and demonstrations are served as a harbinger for 
more violent behaviour such as mass riots. Not many riots were found in Hong 
Kong last year. However, a small scale riot happened a few nights right after the 
June 4 Massacre had caused concern. A truck cruises on Nathan Road with its 
full complement of protesters. They come in commercial vans, cars and trucks. 
All have banners and posters stuck to their vehicles, and strips of black cloth tied 
to antennae. A few hundred youths marched and chanted slogans. But the 
anguish and poignance of former protest marches was not there, the discipline 
which marked the demonstration by day was absent either. 
As viewed by the respondents, the mass riots are less likely (3.33) to occur 
and this political risk will be reduced (3.83) after the handover of Hong Kong's 
sovereignty to mainland China. The enormous outburst of emotion in the 
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territory, with anger and grief may be suppressed by the tighter control of the 
policies under the "one country, two systems" for post 1997 Hong Kong. And 
thus, the concerns for business interests from both the local and foreign investors 
will also be less threatened by mass riots as time passes by. 
Government Structure 
The respondents believed that the government structure is quite favourable 
(3.92) before 1997 but becomes less favourable (2.00) afterwards. In reality, a 
public opinion poll has found that the majority of people in Hong Kong are 
apathetic about the final draft of the Basic Law while fewer than 1% say they are 
very satisfied with the mini-constitution. Since the arguments over the democratic 
development after 1997 will largely depend upon China's democracy view over 
Hong Kong, most of our executives believed that China's pace will not be fast 
enough to allow Hong Kong to retain its economic success which is essential for 
corporate investment and growth. And therefore, respondents, views towards the 
threat posed by the government structure after 1997 and generally pessimistic. 
Relations with China 
Hong Kong is regarded by many companies as the gateway for gaining 
entry into the enormous Chinese market. It is also a major channel for goods to 
and from China. The impressive growth and continuous prosperity of Hong Kong 
in the past decade was largely attributable to the economic development and 
friendly relationship with China. 
Although the Yang Yang's incidence and the disputes over Basic Law has 
created substantial confrontation (3.08), the respondents believed that there is a 
positive sign for improving the relations (3.50) after the handover of Hong Kong 
to China. 
For most people in Hong Kong, the best hope is that the monstrous events 
in Beijing will precipitate the downfall of the discredited group of old men 
currently in control, and that a new leadership will emerge within the next few 
years who can be more reliable guarantors of Hong Kong's future. One other 
consolation: there are still seven years to repair the relationship. 
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Relations with Foreign Countries 
The change in relationships of Hong Kong with foreign countries may 
affect the respondents' trading and other business activities. As viewed by the 
respondents, the relationship between Hong Kong and foreign countries were 
highly favourable (4.33) before 1997，but become fairly favourable (3.00) 
afterwards. 
Nowadays, Hong Kong is slowly pulling itself out of the slump following 
the upheavals in China last year. After the handover of Hong Kong to China, 
some consultancy says deteriorating politics, higher inflation and infrastructure 
bottlenecks will be "scaring away the potential investors", although the investment 
climate remains generally attractive. Our respondents holds the same depressing 
view. However, Mr. Martin Barrow, the Chairman of Hong Kong Tourist 
Association, say the territory should therefore be promoted as an international, 
exciting and vibrant city in Asia. Perhaps, Hong Kong government should 
promptly step up its own activities through its overseas offices to improve its 
relations with the foreign countries. 
Developing 
Internal External 
Open Direct Economic Stability Economic Recession 
Currency Convertibility 11 legal immigrants e.g. Vietnamese 
refugee and Chinese illegal 
Labour Shortage immigrants. 
Labour Productivity Quota and Tariff imposed by 
foreign countries 
Indirect Brain Drain Change of Political Leaders 
Social Demonstration to urge for Relations with Foreign Countries, 
more democracy. especially with China and U.S. 
Price Stability, mainly inflation 
Figure 12. Political Risk Factors in Hong Kong before 1997, based on Simon's (1984) model. 
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W e can classified the risk factors with score equal to or below three, as 
identified by the experts, as the major political risk in Hong Kong. The tables 
in Figure 12 and 13 summarise such political risk as based on Simon's four 
dimensions, for the period before and after 1997 respectively. 
Developing 
Internal External 
Open Direct Economic Stability Economic Recession 
Currency Convertibility 11 legal immigrants e.g. Vietnamese 
refugee and Chinese illegal 
Labour Shortage immigrants. 
Labour Productivity 
Indirect Brain Drain Change of Political Leaders 
in China and their Leadership 
Social Demonstration struggle 
Restriction on Capital/Profit Deteriorating relations with 
in China and their power 
Repatriation struggle 
Price StabiUty, mainly inflation Deteriorating relations with 
Foreign Countries. 
Government Structure, may have 
too much bueaureacy and red-tape 
Policy Stability 
Figure 13. Political Risk Factors in Hong Kong after 1997, based on Simon's (1984) model. 
Risk Avoidance Strategies 
The final task in assessing political risk is to devise strategies for 
diminishing a firm's risk exposure. While there is little a company can do to 
ward off internal violence or political instability, there are a number of 
techniques it can employ to discourage expropriation. From the experts' opinion 
survey, besides asking the respondents the types of political risk they are facing, 
we also ask their insight on the risk avoidance strategies. Their responses are 
graphed and the most popular few are discussed as follows: 
44 
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I—I—I —I —I — I — I 
Joint venture with Foreign Firms |____纖議_議_霧_議| 6 
Reduce Fixed Assets Investment 議 _ 纖 漏 • 議 5 
international Diversification 謹議_議議圓謹_議議丨 5 
of Investment 
Adapt to Local Political Policy 議 議 議 霧 , 5 
Increase Foreign Financing " ] 4 
1 
Close down business |凝•凝総：2 
I 1 
Increase Local Borrowing j 11111111 2 
I 
Joint Venture with Local Firms | 0 
Control Sourcing 0 
I 
Control Ski 11 to Operate | 0 
8 
Control Export and Sales | 0 
Number of respondents = 6 
Figure 14. Risk Avoidance Policies from Expert's Opinion Pol I. 
Joint Venture with Foreign Firms 
The first method of diversifying political risk can be through joint venture 
investment projects with foreign companies or nationals or to allow foreign 
country stockholders to participate in the financing. For instance, by allowing 
stockholders to own a sizable portions of the firms investment, say 40%, while 
retaining a controlling interest, the firm transfers a portion of the political risk 
to foreign countries' citizens. 
International Diversification of Investment 
Political risk can be minimized through international diversification of 
investment. Firms may choose to diversify the risks of their operations among 
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Other multinationals. For example, manufacturing plant can be moved to other 
countries that possess similar comparative advantages as well as a strong host 
government that stands up to the protectionism sentiment of the developed 
countries. 
Reduce Fixed Assets Investment 
Political insurance is not available to Hong Kong investors. To cope with 
the political risk in Hong Kong, most of the respondents adopt an adaptive 
approach. With limited bargaining power, the small investors form Hong Kong 
vulnerable to environmental changes. However, they have their own protective 
measures. 83% of the respondents try to recover all their investments within 
three to five years to reduce their risk exposure. They can either reduce the 
fixed assets or finance more short term projects so that their investments are all 
recovered within short time. And therefore, any political changes in Hong Kong 
are unlikely to cause them great damages. , 
Adapt to Local Political Policy 
Risk minimisation methods include keeping a close monitoring of the local 
political policies and evaluating its effects on the nature of the territory. Both 
of the local and foreign firms can do so to minimize the political risk. 
Increase Foreign Financing 
Last but the least, firms can diversify their risks by enhancing their 
political leverage. In the financing decision, for example, firms can seek broad 
international financing rather than relying on single country sources. 
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C H A P T E R VI 
DISCUSSION 
Our survey find that the political risk in Hong Kong, from the 
businessmen's point of view, is not very substantial before 1997. Brain drain, 
industrial relations and social demonstration are the major political risk in the 
territory while other risks such as economic stability, restriction on capital/profit 
repatriation, government structure... etc are not likely to cause great trouble to 
the territory. After 1997，however, economic stability, restriction on capital/profit 
repatriation, policy stability and government structure may become substantial 
while brain drain, industrial relations and social demonstration are expected to 
improve. It is believed, therefore, Hong Kong's political risk environment will 
worse off after 1997 but the business experts also indicated that such depressed 
environment may be back to business as usual as time goes by. 
Some optimistic businessmen believe that Hong Kong will continue to act 
as the headquarters for administrative, marketing, design and research and 
development operations as there is no better place in Asia than Hong Kong to 
do much of the support work for the manufacturing and trading sectors. 
Nevertheless, it is generally believed that Hong Kong may become more 
difficult to govern as 1997 approaches. There is a danger of political turmoil if 
the Hong Kong government, acting under orders from London, refuses to 
establish a sufficient number of directly elected seats in the Legislative Council 
to satisfy popular demands for democracy. 
The continuing brain drain lead to a breakdown of government services, 
such as schools and hospitals. Unemployment may mount as capital is withdrawn 
from Hong Kong enterprises and invested overseas. 
There is the likelihood of inflation as employers bid up wages in order to 
attract the diminishing supply of professionals. There may be increasing 
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industrial militancy when workers go on strike for higher wages and better 
retirement benefits to protect themselves against a bleak economic future. 
The frustrations of those who cannot leave may erupt into violent 
demonstrations and protests. If such a situation should arise, it is quite 
conceivable that the British Government would decide to cut its losses and 
terminate colonial rule without delay. 
After 1997，it is expected that the territory will undergo a period of 
economic depression. Instead of being a regional head-quarter for the whole 
Asia, Hong Kong may be reduced to a service centre primarily for China and 
Taiwan only. 
Foreign firms which already have investment in Hong Kong or are going 
to invest in the territory need to closely monitor the activities of the Chinese 
government and evaluate its effects on the future of Hong Kong. Diversification 
of risk can also be achieved by moving manufacturing plants to other countries 
that possess similar comparative advantage as well as a strong host government 
that stands up to the protectionism sentiment of the developed countries. To 
reduce the currency fluctuations, companies are advised to keep the trading in 
foreign currencies as much as possible. 
Risk administration includes a constant review of the whole risk 
management programme including taking action to identify, assess and handle all 
potential areas of exposure. Decision should be made as to which risks need to 
be dealt with, and what level of risk retention is desirable. This is, of course, a 
continual process. 
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(Note: Political Risk refers to all unwanted consequences adverse to business and is 
bought about by political sources or environment.) 




a) Economic stability (Before 1997) 5 4 3 2 1 
(After 1997) 5 4 3 2 1 
b) Exchange rate stability 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
c) Currency convertibility 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
d) Stability of price 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
e) Restriction on capital/profit repatriation 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
f) Economic recession 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
g) Labour productivity 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
h) Change of political leaders in China 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
i) Policy stability 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
j) Brain Drain 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
k) Labour Shortage 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
1) Industrial relations (relationship between 5 4 3 2 1 
employers & employees) 5 4 3 2 1 
m) Social demonstrations 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
n) Riots 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
o) Government structure 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
p) Relations with China 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
q) Relations with foreign countries 5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
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DEMOGRAPHIC 
(2) Please indicate the attributes of your current company? 
a) Nationality of your company 
b) Industry IZZ^ZZIIZIIII 
c) Number of employees I I Z ^ ^ Z ^ I I I Z Z 
d) Number of years it has been started IIIZZZ^^IIIIIZ 
(3) From your opinion, what are the major political risks for business in Hong Kong? 
(Please specify in order of importance) 
Before 1997 
After 1997 




Before 1997 5 4 3 2 1 
After 1997 5 4 3 2 1 
(5) What are the most appropriate risk avoidance policies to reduce political risks 
for business in Hong Kong? (Please check whenever appropriate) 
Close down business 
Reduce fixed assets investment in Hong Kong 
Increase local borrowing 
Increase foreign financing 一 
Joint venture with foreign firms 
Joint venture with local firms 
International diversification of investment 
Control sourcing 
Control skill to operate 
Control export and sales 
Adapt to local political policy — 
(6) Could you suggest any other risk avoidance policies for your corporation? 
T H A N K Y O U F O R Y O U R KIND ASSISTANCE ！ 
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APPENDIX 1 
POLITICAL RISK FACTORS FROM EXPERT OPINION 
TIME FIRST SECOND THIRD FINAL 
SITUATIONS SPAN INTERVIEW INTERVIEW INTERVIEW RESULT 
Economic Stability Before 1997 4.08 3.83 - 3.83 
After 1997 2.62 2.75 - 2.75 
Exchange Rate Stability Before 1997 4.67 - - 4.67 
After 1997 2.83 3.00 - 3.00 
Currency Convertibility Before 1997 5.00 - - 5.00 
After 1997 3.00 3.17 - 3.17 
Price Stability Before 1997 A.00 - - 4.00 
After 1997 3.50 3.33 - 3.33 
Restriction on Capital Before 1997 5.00 - - 5.00 
/Profit Repatriation After 1997 2.33 2.50 2.25 2.25 
Economic Recession * Before 1997 3.67 4.00 4.17 4.17 
After 1997 3.17 3.17 3.00 3.00 
Labour Productivity Before 1997 4.17 4.00 - 4.00 
After 1997 3.17 - - 3.17 
Change of Political Before 1997 3.67 3.50 - 3.50 
Leaders * After 1997 1.67 - - 1.67 
Policy Stability Before 1997 3.83 A.00 3.83 3.83 
After 1997 1.83 - - 1.83 
Brain Drain * Before 1997 1.67 1.83 - 1.83 
After 1997 3.50 3.17 3.33 3.33 
Labour Shortage * Before 1997 1.83 - - 1.83 
After 1997 3.67 3.50 3.67 3.67 
Industrial Relations * Before 1997 3.00 3.00 2.83 2.83 
After 1997 3.17 3.17 3.00 3.00 
Social demonstrations * Before 1997 2.67 2.52 2.50 2.50 
After 1997 3.50 3.48 3.50 3.50 
Riots * Before 1997 3.17 3.33 - 3.33 
After 1997 3.67 3.83 - 3.83 
Government Structure Before 1997 3.83 3.92 - 3.92 
After 1997 2.00 - - 2.00 
Relations with China Before 1997 3.17 3.08 - 3.08 
After 1997 3.50 - - 3.50 
Relations with Foreign Before 1997 4.33 - - 4.33 
Countries After 1997 | 3.00 2.83 - 2.83 
I 





RISK AVOIDANCE POLICES FROM EXPORT OPINION 
FREQUENCY 
First Second Th1rd 
SUGGESTED POLICIES Interview!Interview Interview 
Close down business 1 2 2 
Reduce Fixed Assets Investment 4 5 5 
Increase Local Borrowing 1 2 2 
Increase Foreign Financing 3 4 4 
Joint Venture with Foreign Firms 6 6 6 
Joint Venture with Local Firms 1 0 0 
International Diversification of Investment 4 5 5 
Control Sourcing 1 0 0 
Control Ski 11 to Operate 1 0 0 
Control Export and Sales 1 0 0 
Adapt to Local Political Policy 4 5 5 
Number of respondents = 6 
Rate of Response = 10% 
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APPENDIX 1 
H O U S E H O L D S H A V I N G RESIDENCY R I G H T O F A F O R E I G N C O U N T R Y 
O R 
INTEND T O M I G R A T E 
(by sex, age, education, household income and occupation) 
Sex Age Education Household Income Occupation 
1 —1 
Prim Seco Under $5,000 $7,500 Prof/Exec/ 
Total M F 15-24 25-39 40+ or < or > $5,000 $7,499 or < Pro/Trad 
% % % % % % % % % % % % 
Respondent or 
his/her family 
members having 17 14 20 14 20 16 12 19 14 13 19 30 
residency right 









right of a foreign 63 63 63 63 57 69 75 57 73 73 57 35 
country & no 
plan to migrate 
Base 3857 1998 185 941 1612 1306 1152 2701 413 802 2482 385 
Unweighed 1109 623 486 264 489 356 293 815 109 210 744 185 




FOR ASIAN COUNTRIES 
IN 1988 & 1989 
COUNTRY GROWTH GDP Inflation 
1988 1989 1988 1989 
NICs 9.4 6.2 4.8 5.8 
Hong Kong 7.3 2.5 7.5 10.0 
South Korea 11.3 5.9 6.9 5.6 
Singapore 11.0 9.2 1.5 2.8 
Taiwan 7.3 7.7 1.3 4.7 
Southeast Asia 8.0 7.7 5.1 6.1 
Indonesia 5.7 6.5 4.9 6.0 
Loaos 2.1 4.0 33.0 60.0 
Malaysia 8.8 7.6 2.5 2.8 
Philippines 6.2 6.0 10.1 9.6 
Thailand 12.0 10.8 3.7 5.8 
Vietnam 5.8 3.2 492.0 35.0 
South Asia 8.5 4.4 9.4 11.8 
Bangladesh 2.7 2.4 9.4 8.0 
India 9.5 4.5 9.1 10.0 
Maldives 8.7 9.3 - _ 
Burma 0.2 3.4 16.9 70.0 
Nepal 9.7 1.5 9.1 10.1 
Pakistan 7.0 5.6 8.8 10.4 
Sri Lanka 2.8 2.0 14.0 11.6 
China 11.2 3.9 20.7 18.0 
Source: SCMP, April 24, 1990 
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APPENDIX 6 
POLITICAL RISK FRAMEWORK BY SIMON (1984) 
Industrialized 
Internal External 
Open Direct Host government licensing. Home government licensing, 
price controls, taxation taxation policies 
Adverse legal rulings Regional and global 
organizations' monitoring 
Negative media reports of MNE operations 
Indirect Bureaucratic delays and Host-home country trade 
procedures disputes 
Elections, public pressure for Bilateral/multilateral trade 
environmental controls agreements detrimental to MNE 
Local business pressure for Global economic developments 
subsidies, favourable treatment 
(a) Industrial and Open. 
Developing 
Internal External 
Open Direct Local content rules, joint Home government licensing, 
venture pressure, technology taxation policies 
transfer an import/export 
regulations Regional and global 
organizations' code of conduct 
Strikes, protests, boycotts, for MNE 
Adverse legal rulings 
Negative media reports | 
Indirect Intra-governmental friction North-South issue disputes 
General strikes, elections Anti-MNE public sentiment due 
to home country's foreign/ 
Local business pressure for military policy 
subsidies, favour tax rates 
Regional/border wars 
High external debt, default 
I Commodity price fluctuations j 




Close Direct Restrictions on remittances Home government restrictions 
on operations 
Strikes, terrorism, violent 
demonstrations/protests Negative home and 
international public opinion, 
disinvestment pressure 
Indirect Coups, radical regime change. Deteriorating host-home 
leadership struggles relations 
Revolution, guerrilla war, riots International economic 
sanctions/boycott 
International protests 
Global economic developments 
(c) Framework for Industrial-Close Country 
Development 
Internal External 
Close Direct Nationalization, expropriation Home government restrictions 
on operations 
Terrorism, riots, strikes 
Negative home and 
international public opinion, 
disinvestment pressure 
Indirect Coups, radical regime change, North-South issue disputes 
leadership struggles 
Anti-MNE public sentiment due 
Revolution, guerrilla war, riots to home country's foreign/ 
mi Iitary policy 
Regional/border wars 
High external debt, default 
Commodity price fluctuations 
(d) Framework for Developing-Close Country 
$oui;ce: Jeffrey D. Simon, "A Theoretical Perspective on Political Risk," Journal of Internet inn；, I 
Business Studies. Winter 1984, P.123-141. — 
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